Corporate governance and merger performance: learning from the

Australian experience by Mohd Hasimi Yaacob, & Norazlan Alias,
GEOGRAFIA Online
TM
 Malaysian Journal of Society and Space 12 issue 2 (95 - 105) 95                                   
Themed issue on contemporary financial, business, investment and entrepreneurial facets of Malaysia’s development  
© 2016, ISSN 2180-2491 
 
 
 
Corporate governance and merger performance: Learning from the 
Australian experience 
 
Mohd Hasimi Yaacob
1
, Norazlan Alias
1 
 
1
Faculty of Economic and Management, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia 
 
Correspondence: Mohd Hasimi Yaacob (email: mhasimi@ukm.edu.my) 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Studies on the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance suggest that ownership structure has a 
significant impact on firm performance . The methodological choice and various merger-related factors have been 
identified as affecting the magnitude of post-merger returns.This study investigates the influence of corporate 
governance characteristics on long-term post-merger stock returns performance of acquirers in Australia. The 
findings reveal that there is evidence of long-term underperformance by Australian acquirers. However, there is 
limited evidence of inter-group difference in performance. Further analysis finds evidence that the market reacts 
positively to merger news for acquirers with high concentration of external substantial shareholders, especially in the 
case of focused mergers. Malaysia may learn from such experience of an Asia Pacific neighbour as it expands and 
deepens its corporate spheres. 
 
Keywords: buy-and-hold abnormal return, calendar-time abnormal return, event studies, long-term performance, 
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Introduction 
 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) have been a phenomenon for firms since the early 1900s until now. 
The studies conducted on M&A  had focused on short term stock returns surrounding announcement dates 
using USA, UK and Canadian data. Only a smaller body of research examined long-term post acquisition 
returns (Martynova & Renneboog, 2008). Most of these long-term post-acquisition studies concluded that 
acquirers experienced significant underperformance for US firms (Agrawal, Jaffe & Mandelker, 1992; 
Moeller, Schlingemann & Stulz, 2003, 2005), while non-significant returns were evident for UK and 
Canadian acquirers (Abhyankar, Ho & Zhao, 2005; Andre, Kooli & L'Her, 2004; Dutta & Jog, 2009). The 
methodological choice and various merger-related factors have been identified as affecting the magnitude 
of post-merger returns. This has motivated us to undertake this study using comprehensive data on 
Australian acquiring firms, combined with multiple benchmarks to analyze the long-term post-merger 
stock performance. 
Our results showed that there is evidence of long-term underperformance by Australian acquirers. 
However, when acquirers were divided into different sub-groups based on firms’ characteristics or shares 
ownership, it showed there is limited evidence of difference in performance between these sub-groups. 
We also found that focused mergers and increasing substantial shareholder ownership significantly 
contribute to positive long-term stock returns’ performance. 
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, in contrast to most M&As studies which 
usually based on USA and UK data, this study examined Australian acquisition, which will represent out-
of-sample evidence for a well-developed capital market with increasingly popular M&A activity in its 
corporate market. In 2009 alone, Australia had 3,353 merger and acquisition (M&A) deals totaling 
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$US151.491 billionn. This represents 25 per cent of M&A activities in the Asia Pacific region or 6.71 
percent of global M&A (The Australian, 5th. January 2010;  Zephyr Quarterly, 2010). Second, there is a 
need for a study on the relationship between corporate governance factors and M&As (Da Silva Rosa & 
Walter, 2004). It is the premise of this study to shed light on, and to help explain, the relationship between 
the type of merger, ownership structure and acquirer long-term post-merger performance. Especially, to 
explain the relationship of acquirer performance and institutional ownership, which we believed very 
limited with the exception of Duggal and Millar (1999). 
 
 
Literature review 
 
The majority studies on long-term M&As performance have identified abnormal returns to be 
insignificantly different from zero, which supports the Efficient Market Hypothesis (Brown & Da Silva 
Rosa, 1998; Loughran & Vijh, 1997; Moeller, Schlingemann & Stulz, 2004). Some studies identified 
significant negative returns for a few years after mergers (Agrawal et al., 1992; Rau & Vermaelen, 1998). 
On the other hand, studies by Healy et.al. (1992) and Manson et. al. (2000) found that the cash flow 
operating returns for both targets and bidders of UK firms improved in the five years following mergers, 
which lends support to the notion that M&A activities are capable of improving firm performance. The 
studies on the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance have been very 
encouraging. They suggested that ownership structure has a significant impact on firm performance 
[Denis et al. (1997), Gorton and Schmid (2000), Chen (2001), La Porta et al. (2002), Pivovarsky (2003), 
Chen et al. (2003), Durnev and Kim (2005), Black et al. (2006)].  
Further, the studies that recognized  insider ownership as a tool for agency cost reduction are 
Holderness et al. (1999),  Kesner (1987), Kim and Lyn (1988) and Leech and Leahy (1991). They proved 
that managerial ownership is positively related to performance indicators. However, Duggal and Millar 
(1999) found no relationship between bidder gains and predicted values of institutional ownership; which 
suggest that institutional investors do not enhance efficiency in market for corporate control, and that their 
monitoring abilities are doubtful. Researchers have also tried to explain why certain types of merger 
prevail over others. Servaes (1996) found that insider ownership was negatively related to diversification 
during the 1960s. Denis, Denis and Sarin’s (1997) results showed that high managerial and institutional 
ownership is associated with reduced level of diversification. This is consistent with Amihud and Lev 
(1981) on the relationship between ownership concentration and the propensity to undertake diversifying 
mergers. In sum, there are certain ownership structure mechanisms which have a potential role in reducing 
the conflict between managers and shareholders, which leads to a reduction in agency costs. 
 
 
Research design 
 
a. Sample selection and data 
 
A total of 821 completed M&A announcements (1997 – 2009) that reported deal values by firms listed on 
the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) have been selected for this study. Then ownership information 
was hand collected from firms’ annual reports. Meanwhile the data on stock price, firm size and other 
annual accounting data were obtained from Thomson Financial DataStream. Summary descriptive 
statistics for the sample are provided in Appendix 1.  
 
b. Methodology 
 
This study investigated stock return performance over 12 months starting from the announcement date of a 
completed deal.  Two different methodologies will be used for the calculation of the abnormal returns. 
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First, based on value-weighted buy-and-hold abnormal returns (VW BHARs). BHARs are defined as the 
return on a buy-and-hold investment in the sample firm less the return on a buy-and-hold investment 
benchmark portfolio. This method has become the standard method of measuring long-term abnormal 
returns (Barber & Lyon, 1997; Lyon, Barber, & Tsai, 1999; Mitchell & Stafford, 2000; Savor & Lu, 
2009). Second, using calendar-time as in Mitchell and Stafford's (2000) study, we proxy the expected 
return on the event portfolio using the Fama and French (1993) three factor model: 
 
Rpt − Rft = αp + bp (RMt − Rft )+ sp (SMBt )+ hp (HMLt )+ εpt                                         (1) 
 
Where, 
(Rpt – Rft) = the equal- or value-weighted excess return on calendar-time portfolio p in month t 
(RMt – Rft) = the market risk premium for month t 
SMBt = the return on the portfolio of small stocks minus the return on the portfolio of large stocks 
for month t (size factor) 
HMLt  =  the return on the portfolio of high book-to market (value) stocks minus the return 
portfolio of low book-to-market (glamour) stocks for month t (book-to-market factor) 
= calendar time abnormal return. 
Then, we run a univariate regression to test the significance differences between the groups of pre-
determined sub-samples.  
 
 
Results and discussions  
 
In this section, we discuss the VW BHAR of same size and B/M percentile benchmarks and VW Fama-
French 3 factor WLS regression for the 12-month post-merger periods will be focused on, with the 
corresponding skewness and cross-correlation adjusted t-statistics used in the evaluation of the null 
hypothesis of zero-mean difference in the abnormal returns between sub-sample groups. The discussion 
will be based on the sub-sample groups within those two methodologies for the 12-month event windows. 
 
Table 1. Univariate analysis of value-weighted BHAR and fama-french 3-factor regression for 12-month 
 
 
Based on size-B/M benchmark Fama-French 3 Factor Regression (VW) 
12 months n1 VW BHAR Adj t-test n2 Alpha - WLS t-test Adj. R sq 
Bod 1: Henry (2008)           
0: 0-32.27% 203 -0.078 -1.651 122 -0.008 -1.19 0.313 
1: > 32.27% 726 -0.042 -1.809 132 -0.009 -3.54 0.735 
(0) - (1)   -0.036 -0.703   0.001 0.24 0.048 
Bod 2: Morck et al. (1988) 
    
  
1: ≤ %5 344 -0.045 -1.561 131 -0.006 -2.25 0.705 
2: 5-25% 310 -0.058 -1.559 124 -0.021 -3.55 0.523 
3: > 25% 275 -0.048 -1.196 122 -0.004 -0.84 0.514 
(1) - (2)   0.013 0.280 
 
0.015 2.51 0.147 
(1) - (3)   0.003 0.055 
 
-0.002 -0.25 0.034 
(2) - (3)   -0.010 -0.191 
 
-0.017 -2.65 0.101 
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12 months 
Based on size-B/M benchmark Fama-French 3 Factor Regression (VW) 
n1 VW BHAR Adj t-test n2 Alpha - WLS t-test Adj. R sq 
Cash               
0 572 -0.070 -2.538 133 -0.007 -2.56 0.715 
1 357 -0.019 -0.655 121 -0.012 -3.18 0.611 
(0) - (1)   -0.051 -1.205   0.005 1.28 0.008 
Cross-Border 
    
  
0 733 -0.045 -0.655 129 -0.008 -1.93 0.703 
1 193 -0.068 -1.431 124 -0.034 -4.92 0.263 
(0) - (1)   0.022 0.145 
 
0.027 3.50 0.077 
Focus               
0 460 -0.058 -2.149 132 -0.014 -3.06 0.624 
1 469 -0.042 -1.414 124 0.002 0.40 0.716 
(0) - (1)   -0.016 -0.385   -0.016 -2.35 0.072 
Institution   
     
  
0 461 -0.083 -2.612 139 -0.013 -2.31 0.488 
1 468 -0.018 -0.727 124 -0.008 -2.89 0.677 
(0) - (1)   -0.066 -1.612 
 
-0.005 -0.85 0.058 
Public               
0 428 -0.048 -1.692 124 -0.009 -1.77 0.620 
1 501 -0.052 -1.826 133 -0.008 -2.28 0.700 
(0) - (1)   0.004 0.090   0.001 0.13 0.011 
Rel Size   
     
  
0 467 0.000 -0.047 132 -0.009 -3.25 0.653 
1 462 -0.100 -3.258 124 -0.010 -2.88 0.634 
(0) - (1)   0.100 2.398 
 
0.001 0.16 0.051 
Subs 1: Henry (2008)           
0: ≤ 27.05% 703 -0.052 -2.287 124 -0.010 -3.78 0.685 
1: > 27.05% 226 -0.044 -0.949 133 -0.010 -1.56 0.372 
(0) - (1)   -0.008 -0.164   0.000 0.13 0.019 
Subs 2: Median value 
     
  
0 462 -0.067 -2.585 127 -0.012 -3.84 0.663 
1 467 -0.034 -1.086 132 -0.006 -1.31 0.608 
(0) - (1)   -0.033 -0.806 
 
-0.006 -1.22 0.016 
Value Acquirer               
0 465 -0.110 -3.953 129 -0.009 -2.08 0.678 
1 464 0.009 0.351 132 -0.010 -2.57 0.690 
(0) - (1)   -0.119 -2.898   0.001 0.05 0.061 
 
The Bod 1 ownership group was divided based on Henry (2008), whereby the group classification is 0 
for ownership levels from 0-32.27%, and 1 for ownership above 32.27%; and, for substantial ownership 
(Subs1), the group classification is 0 for ownership levels from 0-27.05%, and 1 for ownership levels 
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above 27.05%. The Bod 2 ownership classification was divided based on Morck et al. (1988), whereby the 
group classification is 1 for ownership less than 5%, 2 for between 5-25% and 3 for ownership above 
25%. The term n1 represents the number of firms in each sub-sample, while n2 represents the numbers of 
portfolio-months with a minimum of four firms in each particular portfolio-month. 
Table 1 shows the results of the univariate analysis of value-weighted BHAR (Column 3) using the 
same size and B/M percentile benchmark, while Column 6 presents the abnormal returns (alphas) from 
WLS Fama-French 3-factor model estimation, over 12-month periods respectively. 
First, from Column 3 (Table 1), there is evidence of statistically significant underperformance for 
acquirers with a high level of BOD share ownership based on the Henry (2008) criteria in the VW BHAR 
and the VW Fama-French 3 factor regression for  the 12-month period after the merger event, with the 
abnormal returns of -0.042 and -0.108 (-0.009 x 12 months), respectively. Whereas, the acquirers with low 
BOD ownership under this sub-sample group criteria experience statistically insignificant abnormal 
returns under both methodologies with abnormal returns of -0.078 and -0.096 respectively. Furthermore, 
there is no significant mean difference between the two sub-sample returns for the +1 to +12 interval 
under the event-time and calendar-time methodologies, with the group return differences being -0.036 and 
0.012, respectively. 
Second, under the Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) BOD ownership criteria, it can be observed that 
for the one-year post-merger period in Panel A of Table 1, firm sub-samples  1 and 2 have experienced 
statistically significant levels of monthly underperformance drift of -0.006 (t-statistic = -2.250) and -0.021 
(t-statistic = -3.550) based on the FF regression model, respectively. The analysis also indicates there is a 
statistically significant performance difference between sub-samples 1 and 2, and also between sub-
samples 2 and 3, with return differences of 0.016 (t-statistic = 2.510) and -0.018 (t-statistic = -2.650), 
respectively. However, there is no indication of statistically significant group return differences under the 
BHAR methodology.  
There is one interesting relationship to notice between BOD ownership and acquirer firms’ 
performance. For example, in the one-year post-merger performance analysis, for BOD ownership under 
the Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) classification, firms with low BOD ownership experienced 
significantly better performance (less negative returns) compared to acquirers with  the median range level 
of BOD ownership.  This implies that having the median level of BOD ownership results in poorer 
acquisition returns; however, when BOD ownership is higher (more than 25%), the underperformance 
level again improves. The same behavior can be observed for the VW BHAR under the Henry (2008) 
criteria, as the level of underperformance improves when BOD ownership increases; however, this change 
is not statistically significant.  
The third results row presents the univariate analysis results based on merger method of payment 
classification. The results show that cash-financed mergers perform better than their counterparts, but the 
group differences are not statistically significant. Specifically, the non-cash financing sub-sample registers 
a statistically significant mean BHAR of -0.070 (t-statistic = -2.538) during the one-year post-event 
window. The cash financing merger subsample, however, shows a lower and statistically insignificant 
BHAR of -0.019.  Meanwhile, under the FF regression model, both sub-sample groups exhibit statistically 
significant underperformance, with acquirers undertaking cash-financed mergers registering negative 
abnormal returns of -0.012 (t-statistic =-3.180) and acquirers in non-cash financed mergers generating 
returns of -0.007 (t-statistic =-2.560). None of the sub-sample groups under the BHAR or FF regression 
model, however, significantly outperforms its counterpart. 
Fourth, based on the Cross-border group sub-sample results, both sub-sample groups fail to exhibit 
statistically reliable return results under the BHAR methodology. However, under the FF regression model 
approach, both sub-groups exhibit statistically significant underperformance, with the local merger (0) 
group performing significantly better than acquirers completing cross-border acquisitions (1), with the 
mean return difference being 0.027 (t-statistic = 3.500) in the one-year event window. 
Generally, based on the Cross border sub-sample results above, we observed that the cross-border 
acquirers performed worse than their control group, one-year period after the merger, under event-time 
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analysis (BHAR) and calendar-time analysis. However, the results fail to report consistent statistically 
significant differences between these two sub-samples. Over the one-year event window, the local mergers 
group exhibit statistically better performance than acquirers involved in cross-border mergers based on the 
FF regression. 
Next, we move on to the performance of the Focus sub-samples, which is identified based on 2-digit 
SIC codes. During the one-year post-event window, the diversification merger (0) sub-sample acquirers 
experience significant underperformance based on event-time (BHAR) and calendar-time analysis 
(CTAR) with a group mean abnormal return of -0.058 (t-statistic = -2.149) and alpha of -0.014 (t-statistic 
= -3.060) respectively. On the other hand, a lower level of underperformance (BHAR = -0.042, t-statistic 
= -1.414) and positive alpha (α= 0.002, t-statistic = 0.400) are reported for acquirers involved in focused 
mergers (1). However, only the FF regression model shows a statistically significant difference in 
performance between the alphas of the focused merger and diversification merger acquirer sub-samples. 
Hence, these results indicate weak support for the hypothesis that acquirers in focused mergers perform 
better (as indicated by lower negative results) than those completing diversification mergers during the 
one-year post-merger period. 
Meanwhile, the performance of the Institutional share ownership sub-samples, which is defined as low 
levels of Institutional share ownership if the institutional shareholding level is below the sample median 
on an annual basis, and high levels of Institutional share ownership if the institutional shareholding level is 
above the sample median on an annual basis. The 12-month post-merger performance based on 
institutional share ownership classification shows that acquirers with low levels of Institutional 
shareholdings (0) experienced a statistically significant mean BHAR of -0.083 (t-statistic = -2.612), while 
acquirers with higher levels of Institutional shareholdings (1) also experienced underperformance as 
represented by an average negative abnormal return of -0.018; however, it is not statistically different 
from zero. On the other hand, the FF regression model shows that both sub-sample groups experienced 
statistically significant underperformance, with acquirers with a higher level of Institutional shareholdings 
performing better compared to the comparison group, with abnormal returns of -0.008 (t-statistic = -2.89) 
and -0.013 (t-statistic = -2.310) respectively. Furthermore, no significant difference between the sub-
samples under the BHAR and CTAR methodologies for the one-year post-merger performance period is 
reported. Thus, the null hypothesis of no significant abnormal return performance difference between 
firms with low and high levels of institutional shareholding during the long-term post-merger period 
cannot be rejected. 
Next, is the analysis based on the Public target sub-sample results for the one-year post-event window. 
The results shows that acquirers that merged with public target firms (1) experience a statistically 
significant greater level of underperformance, with BHAR of -0.052 (t-statistic = -1.826), compared to 
acquirers that merge with private firm targets (0) which experienced returns that are not statistically 
different from zero. Under the FF regression model, both sub-samples show statistically significant 
underperformance, with public target acquirers just marginally outperforming their counterparts with 
monthly abnormal returns of -0.008 (t-statistic = -1.770) and -0.009 (t-statistic = -2.280) respectively. 
However, the mean difference between the two sample groups is not statistically significant under the 
BHAR and FF regression model approaches.  
Similarly, the same sign and magnitude nature to those outlined in the type of target analysis above can 
be observed under the Relative size of target-to-acquirer sub-samples criteria. For the one-year period 
after the merger, acquirers with higher relative size (1) experienced statistically significant BHARs of -
0.100 (t-statistic = -3.258), compared to acquirers with low relative size (0) which reports zero average 
abnormal returns. Alternatively, based on the FF regression model, both sub-samples exhibit significant 
underperformance. The acquirers with lower relative size experience lower underperformance compared 
to the acquirers with higher relative size, with abnormal returns of -0.010 (t-statistic = -3.250) and -0.009 
(t-statistic = -2.880) respectively. However, the results do not register any significant abnormal return 
difference between the two groups of acquirers. 
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Next, we analyzed the acquirers’ stock market performance based on substantial shareholder ownership 
using the Henry (2008) criteria, and tested the null hypothesis of no significant mean return difference 
between acquirers with low and high levels of substantial share ownership using the adjusted t-test for the 
event-time methodology and the normal two-tailed t-test for the calendar time methodology. During first 
year after the merger, the acquirers with low level of substantial shareholdings (0) experienced statistically 
significant BHARs of -0.052 (t-statistic = -2.287), while acquirers with a higher level of substantial 
shareholdings (1) experienced lower abnormal returns of -0.044, which are also not significantly different 
from zero. A similar pattern can be observed under the FF regression model, with acquirers with low 
substantial shareholder ownership showing higher statistically significant underperformance based on 
monthly mean returns of -0.010 (t-statistic = -3.780), while acquirers with a higher level of substantial 
shareholdings earned  non-significant returns. Furthermore, no significant differences between the low and 
high ownership firm sub-samples under the BHAR and CTAR methodologies during the one-year post-
merger period are reported.  
Further, the analysis also examined the influence of substantial shareholder ownership, using median 
values as the cut-off criteria, on one-year post-merger performance. The results  portray an almost similar 
pattern to the results from the substantial shareholder ownership criteria based on Henry (2008). The 
results favor the performance of acquirers with high level of substantial shareholdings (1) compared to the 
acquirers with low levels of substantial shareholdings (0). The high level of substantial shareholdings 
acquirers experienced insignificant abnormal returns under the BHAR and FF regression model methods, 
with average return outcomes of -0.034 (t-statistic = -1.086) and -0.006 (t-statistic = -1.310), respectively.  
On the other hand, the acquirers subject to a lower level of substantial shareholder influence experienced 
statistically significant lower (inferior) abnormal returns under the BHAR and FF regression model 
approaches with returns of -0.067 (t-statistic = -2.585) and -0.012 (t-statistic = -3.840), respectively. 
Although the results shows that acquirers with a higher level of substantial shareholdings performed better 
in this event window, this indication cannot be confirmed statistically, as there is no significant difference 
between the sub-sample group returns under the BHAR and CTAR methodologies.  
Based on both substantial shareholder ownership criteria described previously, it appears that the 
market perceives that acquirers with higher levels of substantial shareholder ownership will make better 
acquisition decisions compared to the acquirers with low levels of substantial shareholder ownership, as 
indicated by the lower degree of underperformance during the one-year period after mergers. However, 
these results do not support the efficient monitoring hypothesis, as none of the mean group return 
differences is statistically significant. These results suggest that large outsider shareholders cannot provide 
better monitoring function to prevent sub-optimal merger decision, such as i) initiating acquisitions in 
order to save face for perceived past management mistakes (Lys & Vincent, 1995); ii) managers resorting 
to takeovers to reduce risk (Amihud and Lev, 1981); iii) managers acquiring growing firms to enhance 
their reputations (Morck et al., 1990); or, iv) managers using acquisitions as a devise to maintain control 
over free cash flows (Jensen, 1988), which resulting most likely from managerial entrenchment. 
Therefore, it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis of no mean difference in returns between 
acquirers with low and high substantial shareholder ownership. 
Finally, sub-samples were analyzed based on the value versus glamour firm criteria. During the one-
year post-event window, the glamour acquirers (0) experienced statistically significant BHARs of -0.110 
(t-statistic = -3.953), compared to value acquirers (1) which had higher (less negative) abnormal returns of 
-0.009, however, they are not statistically significant. The group comparison results show that value 
acquirers performed significantly better than glamour acquirers, with the mean return difference being 
0.119 (t-statistic = 2.898). Under the FF regression model, both sub-sample groups show statistically 
significant levels of underperformance, with alpha values of -0.009 (t-statistic = -2.080) and -0.010 (t-
statistic = -2.570) for glamour acquirers and value acquirers respectively. However, the results do not 
register any significant abnormal return difference between the two groups of acquirers. 
In summary, based on the above results, it can be concluded that, generally, Australian acquirers did 
not perform well over the 12-month period following merger announcement, as indicated by the negative 
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stock market abnormal returns identified by the event-time and calendar-time methodologies. This is an 
indication that the market reacted negatively to the corporate control activity of acquirers (André, Kooli, 
& L'Her, 2004; Jarrell & Poulsen, 1989; Rau & Vermaelen, 1998) over the long-term, which reflects the 
completion of acquisition and post-acquisition integration aspect. Further analysis of the abnormal return 
performance using various sub-samples reveals that there are also certain firm-specific and takeover-
specific attributes which impact on return outcomes for acquirers. 
The long-term performance of acquirers is found to be positively correlated with the level of BOD 
ownership and, up until certain point, this relation could be non-linear as described by Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishny, (1988). The results shows that firms with low BOD ownership experienced statistically 
significantly lower underperformance  compared to acquirers with  medium levels of BOD ownership; 
however, when ownership is higher (more than 25%), the underperformance level exhibits improvement 
again.  Generally, this result is consistent with agency theory (Jensen and Mackling, 1976) and the non-
linear relationship between board share ownership and general (not merger-specific) firm performance 
identified by Morck et al. (1988). Thus, supports the alternative hypothesis that higher BOD ownership is 
expected to lower agency costs, reduced inefficiency and thereby leading to superior long-term merger 
performance. However, this result should be interpreted with caution due to the possibility of non-linear 
relationship between BOD ownership and firm performance (Morck et al., 1988). 
The acquirer which undertaken cash-financed mergers, local target mergers, focused mergers and 
public target merger appear not to be able to outperform their respective counterpart. Furthermore, there is 
an indication that institutional investors have a positive and beneficial effect on acquirer long-term post-
merger performance. During the three-year post-merger period, acquirers with greater institutional 
investor shareholdings experienced significantly higher (less negative) returns than low institutional 
shareholding acquirers based on the event-time methodology, and which is also weakly supported by the 
calendar-time methodology.  
The relative size of targets compared to acquirers appears to negatively affecting acquirer long-term 
post-merger performance. According to the BHAR and FF regression model techniques, acquirers that 
merged with relatively smaller size targets performed significantly better compared to if they merge with 
relatively bigger targets. 
The substantial share ownership results do not support the efficient monitoring hypothesis, which 
suggest that large outsider shareholders do not provide a better monitoring function and guide firm 
managements to make superior decisions in acquisitions. Thus, the acquirers are unable to achieve 
superior long-term performance compared to acquirers with low concentration of substantial share 
ownership. 
The results based on the glamour versus value acquirers classification exhibit conflicting conclusions 
in regard to their performances of within the one-year and three-year post-event windows. However, based 
on the event-time methodology results, it can be concluded that value acquirers achieve significantly 
greater post-merger performance results than glamour acquirers. 
 
 
Summary and conclusions 
 
In this study, we empirically examined the long-term abnormal returns of Australian acquirer by using a 
comprehensive sample of 821 M&As from Jan 1997 to Jun 2009. We used both event time and calendar-
time methodologies and variety of benchmarks to detect long-term stock returns performance; and it was 
discovered that the results are sensitive to these choices. 
Consistent with the viewpoint of earlier documented studies, such as by Agrawal et al., (1992) and 
Moeller et al., (2003, 2005), we found results supporting the indication of long-term underperformance of 
Australian. We acknowledged this negative abnormal return may be due to ‘chance results’ as stated by 
Fama (1998). We also investigated the inter-group difference in long-term performance and only managed 
to present statistically differences between groups with low-high relative target size. In a further analysis, 
GEOGRAFIA Online
TM
 Malaysian Journal of Society and Space 12 issue 2 (95 - 105) 103                                   
Themed issue on contemporary financial, business, investment and entrepreneurial facets of Malaysia’s development  
© 2016, ISSN 2180-2491 
 
we found evidence that the market reacts positively to merger news for acquirers with high concentration 
of external substantial shareholders, especially when it is a focused merger. 
  
 
References 
 
Abhyankar A, Ho K-Y, Zhao H (2005) Long-run post-merger stock performance of UK acquiring firms: 
A stochastic dominance perspective. Applied Financial Economics 15(10), 679 - 690.   
Agrawal A, Jaffe JF, Mandelker NG (1992) The Post-Merger Performance of Acquiring Firms: A Re-
Examination of an Anomaly. The Journal of Finance 47(4), 1605-1621.   
André P, Kooli M, L'Her J-F (2004) The Long-Run Performance of Mergers and Acquisitions: Evidence 
from the Canadian Stock Market. Financial Management 33(4), 27-43.   
Andre P, Kooli M, L'Her JF (2004) The long-run performance of mergers and acquisitions: Evidence from 
the Canadian stock market. Financial Management 33(4), 27-43.   
Barber BM, Lyon JD (1997) Detecting long-run abnormal stock returns: The empirical power and 
specification of test statistics. Journal of Financial Economics 43(3), 341-372.   
Black BS, Jang H, Kim W (2006) Predicting firms' corporate governance choices: Evidence from Korea. 
Journal of Corporate Finance 12(3), 660-691.  
Brown P, Da Silva Rosa R (1998) Research Method and the Long-Run Perfor Mance of Acquiring Firms. 
Australian Journal of Management 23(1), 23-38.  
Chen CR, Guo W, Mande V (2003) Managerial ownership and firm valuation: Evidence from Japanese 
firms. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 11(3), 267-283.  
Chen J (2001) Ownership Structure as Corporate Governance Mechanism: Evidence from Chinese Listed 
Companies. Economics of Planning 34(1), 53-72.  
Da Silva Rosa R, Walter T (2004) Australian Mergers and Acquisitions Since the 1980s: What Do We 
Know and What Remains to Be Done? Australian Journal of Management 29 (1_suppl), e0-7.  
Denis DJ, Denis DK, Sarin A (1997) Agency Problems, Equity Ownership, and Corporate Diversification. 
The Journal of Finance 52(1), 135-160.   
Duggal R, Millar JA (1999) Institutional ownership and firm performance: The case of bidder returns. 
Journal of Corporate Finance 5(2), 103-117.  
Durnev ART, Kim EH (2005) To Steal or Not to Steal: Firm Attributes, Legal Environment, and 
Valuation. The Journal of Finance 60(3), 1461-1493.  
Dutta S, Jog V (2009) The long-term performance of acquiring firms: A re-examination of an anomaly. 
Journal of Banking & Finance 33(8), 1400-1412.   
Gorton G, Schmid FA (2000) Universal banking and the performance of German firms. Journal of 
Financial Economics 58(1-2), 29-80.  
Healy PM, Palepu KG, Ruback RS (1992) Does corporate performance improve after mergers? Journal of 
Financial Economics 31(2), 135-175.   
Henry D (2008) Corporate Governance Structure and the Valuation of Australian Firms: Is There Value in 
Ticking the Boxes? Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 35(7-8), 912-942.  
Holderness C, Kroszner R, Sheehan D (1999) Were the good old days that good? Changes in managerial 
stock ownership since the great depression. Journal of Finance 54, 435-470.  
Jarrell GA, Poulsen AB (1989) The returns to acquiring firms in tender offers: Evidence from three 
decades. Financial Management 18(3), 12-18. 
Kesner IF (1987) Director's Stock Ownership and Organizational Performance: An Investigation of 
Fortune 500 Companies. Journal of Management 13(3), 499.   
Kim W-S, Lyn EO (1988) Excess Market Value, Market Power and Inside Ownership Structure. Review 
of Industrial Organization 3(4), 1-25.   
La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A (2002) Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation. Journal 
of Finance 57(3), 1147-1170.   
GEOGRAFIA Online
TM
 Malaysian Journal of Society and Space 12 issue 2 (95 - 105) 104                                   
Themed issue on contemporary financial, business, investment and entrepreneurial facets of Malaysia’s development  
© 2016, ISSN 2180-2491 
 
Leech D, Leahy J (1991) Ownership Structure, Control Type Classifications and the Performance of Large 
British Companies. The Economic Journal 101(409), 1418-1437.   
Loughran T, Vijh AM (1997) Do long-term shareholders benefit from corporate acquisitions? Journal of 
Finance 52(5), 1765-1790.   
Lyon JD, Barber BM, Tsai C-L (1999) Improved Methods for Tests of Long-Run Abnormal Stock 
Returns. The Journal of Finance 54(1), 165-201.   
Lys T, Vincent L (1995) An Analysis of Value Destruction in AT&T's Acquisition of NCR. Journal of 
Financial Economics 39(2–3), 353-378.  
Manson S, Powell R, Stark AW, Thomas HM (2000) Identifying the Sources of Gains from Takeovers. 
Accounting Forum 24(4), 319.   
Martynova M, Renneboog L (2008) A century of corporate takeovers: What have we learned and where 
do we stand? Journal of Banking & Finance 32(10), 2148-2177.  
Mitchell Mark L, Stafford E (2000) Managerial Decisions and Long Term Stock Price Performance. The 
Journal of Business 73(3), 287-329.  
Moeller SB, Schlingemann FP, Stulz RM (2003) Do shareholders of acquiring firms gain from 
acquisitions? Working Paper. Ohio State University.  
Moeller SB, Schlingemann FP, Stulz RM (2004) Firm size and the gains from acquisitions. Journal of 
Financial Economics 73(2), 201-228.  
Moeller SB, Schlingemann FP, Stulz RM (2005) Wealth Destruction on a Massive Scale? A Study of 
Acquiring-Firm Returns in the Recent Merger Wave. The Journal of Finance 60(2), 757-782.   
Morck R, Shleifer A, Vishny RW (1988) Management ownership and market valuation: An empirical 
analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 20, 293-315.  
Rau PR, Vermaelen T (1998) Glamour, value and the post-acquisition performance of acquiring firms. 
Journal of Financial Economics 49(2), 223-253.   
Savor PG, Lu Q (2009) Do Stock Mergers Create Value for Acquirers? The Journal of Finance 64(3), 
1061-1097.  
Servaes H (1996) The Value of Diversification During the Conglomerate Merger Wave. The Journal of 
Finance 51(4), 1201-1225.  
The Australian" Newspaper, 5th. January 2010. 
Zephyr Quarterly M&A Report -  Asia Pacific, Q1 2010. 
GEOGRAFIA Online
TM
 Malaysian Journal of Society and Space 12 issue 2 (95 - 105) 105                                   
Themed issue on contemporary financial, business, investment and entrepreneurial facets of Malaysia’s development  
© 2016, ISSN 2180-2491 
 
Appendix 
 
Panel A. Sample construction and transaction value (over 1997–2009) 
 
Year 
No. of 
completed 
Australian 
M&A 
announcements 
Foreign 
acquirer 
Australian 
Proprietary 
Limited (Pty 
Ltd) 
acquirer 
Australian 
Public 
Limited 
acquirer 
No. of 
completed  
M&A with 
governance  
information 
Total  
transaction  
value (th.  
AUD) 
Avg.  
transaction 
value (th. 
AUD) 
1997 20 13 1 6 2 256,113.65 128,056.83 
1998 24 14 4 6 3 80,634.17 26,878.06 
1999 40 25 1 14 8 1,339,730.78 167,466.34 
2000 129 39 14 76 39 414,593.75 10,630.61 
2001 139 44 16 79 49 19,220,178.08 392,248.53 
2002 133 41 16 76 38 1,934,352.12 50,904.01 
2003 218 42 33 143 95 7,938,597.50 83,564.18 
2004 236 57 36 143 101 5,785,210.49 57,279.31 
2005 239 47 51 141 98 9,775,125.09 99,746.17 
2006 218 51 40 127 93 16,097,899.25 173,095.69 
2007 317 73 60 184 132 20,071,119.08 152,053.93 
2008 223 42 43 138 126 18,225,032.73 144,643.12 
2009* 81 24 14 43 37 2,067,449.21 55,877.01 
Total 2,017 512 329 1,176 821 103,206,036 125,707.72 
            Note: * until end of Jun 2009 
 
Panel B. Transactions by acquirer’s primary SIC code 
 
 
Transactions 
Avg. Transaction 
value (th. AUD) 
Total  transaction 
 
No. % (th. AUD) % 
01-09 Agriculture, Forestry, & 
Fishing 4 0.49 32,279.31 129,117.32 0.13 
10-14 Mining 196 23.87 121,040.98 23,734,031.28 22.99 
15-17 Construction 21 2.56 48,596.98 1,020,536.66 0.99 
20-39 Manufacturing 144 17.54 69,907.25 10,066,644.36 9.75 
40-49 Transportation & Public 
Utilities 66 8.04 198,565.26 13,105,307.18 12.70 
50-59 Trade 46 5.60 137,205.64 6,311,459.68 6.11 
60-64 Finance & Insurance 38 4.63 412,491.70 15,674,684.53 15.19 
65 Real Estate 17 2.07 119,014.38 2,023,244.49 1.96 
67 Holding & Other Investment 
Offices 82 9.99 239,804.08 19,663,934.82 19.05 
70-89 Services 207 25.21 55,493.12 11,487,075.74 11.13 
Total 821 100.00 125,707.72 103,206,036 100.00 
 
Panel C. Transactions by targets country 
 
Country # of Transactions Total transaction value (th. AUD) Avg. transaction (th. AUD) 
Australia 652 70095435.65 107508.33 
New Zealand 18 6494046.62 360724.81 
United 
Kingdom 42 17496988.86 416594.97 
US 38 5800732.92 152650.86 
Others 71 3,318,832 46744.11 
Total 821 103,206,036 125,707.72 
 
